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Abstract
In industrial organisation economics sunk costs, defined as unretrievable costs in the case of market exit, are assumed to determine market structure, firm entry and exit, enterprise investment and pricing strategies. Sunk costs in economic geography have been considered as an ingredient of firm behaviour, an analytical device linking ‘spatial fixity’ and ‘spatial plasticity’, and a source of industrial rigidity. It is significant that geographical research to date on sunk costs focuses mainly their operation in theory. An alternative view is developed here where ‘sunkness’ derives from firms’ inability to realise in the market the full value of their product and the residual value of capital investment. The parallel examination of value-added, labour cost and capital depreciation facilitates such a measure of ‘cost recovery’ for each region. Differential cost recovery then becomes both a cause and an effect of differential regional economic performance. Manufacturing in the regions of Greece during the eighties provides the context.

1. Introduction
Sunk costs, broadly defined as those costs that once committed are irrecoverable in the case of exit, have emerged as an interesting notion in contemporary economic geography. Their introduction can be attributed to CLARK (1994) who first used the concept to obtain a new perspective on industrial restructuring by examining the various dimensions of corporate strategy. The exploration of the relationship between structure and strategy led to the claim that sunk costs were an important element in the design and implementation of firm strategy itself. Indeed, it is argued that they represent both the historical and geographical dimensions of this key process in business. CLARK and WRIGLEY (1995) subsequently argue further the importance of sunk costs in geographical thinking and, according to them, this notion can bridge the gap between studies of corporate restructuring and studies of post-fordism. Additionally, sunk costs, they believe, can provide an explanatory framework for both spatial inertia and plasticity in processes of regional economic change. In more recent work, the concept is usefully invoked in both the examination of the spatial configuration of firm productive capacity (CLARK and WRIGLEY, 1997a) and the exploration of the economic logic behind plant closure and firm exit processes (CLARK and WRIGLEY, 1997b). Finally, the role of sunk costs as a source of industrial rigidity (EKINSMYTH et al, 1995; SCHOENBERGER, 1997) and the question whether retail land and property investment contain significant sunk costs elements (GUY, 1997) are issues attracting interest from other researchers.

Although there have been numerous attempts in economics to model the importance of sunk costs in various contexts, the application in geography to date remains largely ‘speculative and theoretical’ (words used by CLARK and WRIGLEY, 1997a p.286 to characterise their paper). Moreover, the analysis is heavily focused on firm strategies while possible regional outcomes remain relatively unexplored. In such a context, this paper attempts to explore the spatial implications of sunk costs by actually attempting to consider them in terms of regional economic performance. The value of the concept is not limited only to its theoretical power but it can help generate new insight into, and perhaps indicators on regional performance, augmenting other measures (MELACHROINOS and SPENCE, 1997a). In the next section the methodological and practical problems that arise for such a task from the classic definitions of sunk costs are examined. An alternative and practical view addressing some of these problems is then proposed. This view is further developed using the notion of cost recovery in the third section. Manufacturing activity in the regions of Greece during the eighties provides the empirical setting for operationalising this notion of sunkness in the fourth part. In the penultimate section an account of manufacturing performance in this particular empirical context is developed through a combined study of various indicators (including sunk costs). The most striking finding is the existence of certain regions where the aggregate success in manufacturing activities being able to recover their costs has been less than zero for more than a decade. This finding and others, perhaps somewhat less dramatic, is characteristic of the implications that sunk costs can have for regional performance. The paper concludes with an account of the potential importance of this alternative view of sunk costs not only for empirical research on regional economic performance but also for understanding the underlying processes.

2. Reinterpreting sunk costs and regional economic performance
A firm, in order to operate in a market and remain a competitive player is obliged to undertake various costs. In the case that the firm decides to exit the market some of the committed costs might be recovered (by being sold or rented to other firms) while some others are unretrievable.  Although the balance of such costs does vary and is determined by many factors, it is the latter category of costs which is usually termed sunk. The critical feature of this conventional definition of sunk costs is that they only become apparent on the death of the firm as a result of its exit from the market

It is more than apparent that many costs can fall under this label. A cursory glance at industrial organisation economics reveals a plethora of sunk costs typologies developed to serve particular research objectives of specific studies. Hence, a first distinction is between tangible (such as fixed capital) and intangible (like advertising) sunk costs (SHAANAN, 1994). SUTTON (1991) distinguishes two groups of sunk costs - exogenous sunk costs which are those faced by all firms entering a particular market (a single plant of minimum efficient scale is an example), and endogenous sunk costs which are those undertaken by individual firms to increase the consumer demand (advertising and R&D are examples). When the focus is only on the tangible sunk costs, firm- or industry-specific sunk costs have been formulated (KESSIDES, 1991; SHAANAN, 1994). The latter include expenses in assets that, through some modification, can be used by other firms operating in the same sector. The former include items of fixed capital that cannot be used by another firm, even in the same sector. Finally, according to the timing of the sunk costs’ commitment, new types like initial and exit sunk costs may be distinguished (JUDD, 1985; BRESNAHAN and REISS, 1993; CLARK and WRIGLEY, 1995).

These typologies are indicative of the broadness of sunk costs, which seem to include literally any cost element. Thus, a long list of different types of costs like fixed capital dedicated to specific use, advertising, production know-how, market knowledge, seniority of labour, training of labour, redundancy compensations, pension payments, environmental regulations, business and market regulations, R&D expenses, legal fees, productive over-capacity, under-utilised machinery or infrastructure have been used in empirical and theoretical studies either as actual or proxy measurements for sunk costs.

Thus, the concept of sunk costs is not only difficult to understand but also to define. Economists overcome this problem by rigorously defining not only their questions, for instance about firm entry or exit patterns, but also their assumptions (CAVES and PORTER, 1976; JUDD, 1985; BRESNAHAN and REISS, 1993). It should also not escape attention that in most studies the models have to make resort to proxies of sunk costs as a whole - advertising expenditure is a favourite variable deployed in this respect. This difficulty of providing a definitive measure of sunk costs cannot solely be attributed to the lack of data.

Sunk costs have been so loosely defined that they basically comprise an all-embracing concept. Durability or specificity in the use of an asset, for example, can be an attribute of every cost element. DIXIT and PINDYCK (1994) for example, characterise as sunk almost all capital investment.

The use of the terms market and exit in the definition also causes additional problems. Traditionally in market entry and exit literature, sunk costs are those that once have been committed cannot been recovered in case of market exit. The consequence of this is that sunk costs cannot be defined unless the firm exits the market. The obvious question that arises is what happens in the majority of cases where the firm does not exit the market but it continues its operation? Are the durable, committed costs for specific tasks not sunk? At this point it might be useful to look to the early versions of the sunk costs doctrine where exit is irrelevant. In opportunity cost theory, sunk costs are considered as historical costs that ‘should not be counted as costs of present or future decisions’ (STEELE, 1996, p. 605-606). In other words, sunk costs are viewed as those costs that once committed are irrecoverable (even if the firm does not exit).

Furthermore, entry and exit are somewhat blurred terms. Both may take various forms (see for example the detailed analysis on firm exit by CLARK and WRIGLEY, 1997b) and it is not always possible to determine what are the sunk costs involved in each case. Even the simplest case, where entry is defined as the production of a commodity which was not produced the previous year by a firm and exit is defined as the opposite (MUELLER, 1991; SLEUWAEGEN and DEHANDSCHUTTER, 1991), is enough to demonstrate the complexity of the issue. In this sense, a firm always has the potential to enter or exit. Sunk costs cannot be defined ex-ante. Furthermore, in case of re-entry into the market, exit does not necessarily entail sunk costs. Again, it is interesting that economists often refer to potential sunk costs in their models.

Finally, defining the term market makes the concept of sunk costs even more complex. In order that the effects of sunk costs in industrial restructuring can be fully explored it is necessary that the particular market or industry be clearly defined. Needless to say, this is a particularly difficult task since there are many criteria to be used (MUELLER, 1991).

From the above it is clear that the terminology of sunk costs in market entry and exit literature raises many problems for the application of the concept at the regional level. For the purposes of this paper such methodological problems can be overcome using an alternative view of sunk costs. The key idea here is the notion of irrevocability. In order that the unretrievable part of a capital investment can be approached the retrievable part has to be examined first.

Suppose a firm that commits a particular capital investment that, according to the traditional definitions of sunk costs, is to a large extent sunk, either due to the specificity or the durability of the costs. The obvious way for the firm to retrieve its outlay and generate profit is to sell the produced commodities or services in the market. In this way the firm hopes that it will recover the full cost of its investment and also derive a profit. The specificity or the durability of the investment elements (fixed capital, R&D, know-how etc.) is not really a concern for the firm as long as it sells its products/services at a price that covers the committed costs. In the course of time the tangible and the intangible assets will depreciate and the firm will recover their value through the selling of the products/services in the market. In the case that the firm fails to sell its products/services at a price that covers the committed costs then, clearly, a case of sunk costs arises, regardless of whether the firm exits the market or continues. Alternatively, the firm has the opportunity to sell a part or the whole of its investment to another agent. In the case where the transfer price is lower than the acquisition price minus the accumulated depreciation, then again classical sunk costs may be said to exist. Where the price is equal to the acquisition price minus the accumulated depreciation, the firm has to face sunk costs in the form of likely differences in the levels of the past returns to capital and the amounts of depreciation.

The conclusion is that sunkness does not exist by itself but derives from the inability of the firm to realise in the market the full value of its product and the residual value of capital investment. Even where assets are not specific or their service lives are short, firms will still have to face sunk costs since they will not be able to fully recover the capital depreciation. It has to be stated at this point that depreciation (physical or economic) of assets is a constant process taking place anyway and the only way it can be recovered is through sales of production. Thus, capital investment is an accumulated asset of annually fluctuating value for the firm. Its value is dependent upon the degree that yearly earnings cover annual depreciation. Moreover, all the related production costs (labour costs etc.) will be, to a certain extent sunk, in the sense that earnings might well not cover expenses.

This observation can lead to the formulation of an alternative view of sunk costs: 
Sunk costs are that part of capital investment whose value cannot be realised in the market, either as a result of a firm's failure to recoup the value of its commodity production and subsequently the embodied capital value in it, or as a result of a firm's inability to recoup the residual value of the capital investment itself.

The advantages of the alternative view are clear. On the one hand, it is not inconsistent with the traditional notion of sunk costs as developed in economics. Sunk costs are related to economic performance, a common practice in economics. Most of the proxies do not refer to capital investment itself but to notions like the capital to output ratio, or minimum efficient scale of plant. On the other hand, it confronts adequately the terminology problems that emerge in more general applications of the conventional definition of sunk costs used in market entry and exit research. The ideas of market and exit are no longer essential for the definition of sunk costs which, to repeat, can exist even though the firm in question might continue its operation. Moreover, it does not discriminate between certain categories of costs as sunk or otherwise. Every cost element might well prove to be sunk depending upon the quality of its management, although, of course, this does not mean that some costs might potentially be more sunk than others.

However, the main advantage of this view is that permits a direct empirical measurement of these costs at sectoral or regional levels, and allows an assessment of their implications for regional economic performance. By co-examining the evolution of value-added, labour costs and fixed capital depreciation at the regional scale it is possible to detect areas where incumbent firms do not recover their costs. The study of the historical fluctuation of such cost elements can unveil persistence, or otherwise, of the impact of sunk costs in regional performance. These are exactly the objectives of the empirical analysis that is to follow looking at manufacturing production performance in the regions of Greece.

3. Operationalising notions of sunkness and cost recovery.
This notion of sunkness as the unretrievable part of the capital investment is not too far distant from the concept of cost recovery that has been proposed by WILLIAMS et al. (1995). Following a different academic tradition - that of social accounting - they argue that in contemporary capitalistic societies the primary aim of firms is the generation of enough cash surplus sufficient not only to cover the labour remuneration costs but also the depreciation of capital, the costs of the re-investment in products and processes, plus interest payments and distributions to shareholders. The argument is that analysis should not focus on profits since they comprise only a small part of the generated cash surplus. Instead, emphasis should be placed on labour costs since they account for the largest part of the value-added in production. They estimate that in post-war western economies the labour cost share in value-added has fluctuated between 60% and 80%. In their view, it is the sum of the value-added remaining after the deduction of labour costs that can be used for the recovery of the remaining committed costs.

Although WILLIAMS et al. have developed the notion of cost recovery having in mind the consequences of free trade between low wage countries and western economies, it is clear and opportune that it can be usefully transformed to accommodate the concept of sunk costs. The fundamental logic of the two concepts is more or the less the same: if firms do not recover their costs then a problem of cash generation emerges. However, while WILLIAMS et al. tend to focus solely on the ways that labour cost differences affect national competitiveness (showing that higher wage disadvantages cannot be easily surpassed by more advanced production methods or better placement of the product in the market), the sunk costs concept offers a wider perspective on the ways that this competition takes place by including the important element of the recovery of committed capital costs. A principal argument of this paper is that using ideas of cost recovery in a sunk costs framework will provide fertile ground for the development of new indicators of regional performance.

An annual measurement of sunk costs by industry or region is feasibly undertaken within the remit of cost recovery. If, in addition to the labour costs, the depreciation of capital is also deducted from the value-added then the remaining amount, if any, will be other recovered costs plus cash surpluses (equation 1). When the level of value-added is insufficient to cover the costs outlaid on labour and capital consumption then sunk costs occur. It can be argued that, to have a comprehensive measure of cost recovery, from this remaining amount should also be deducted any other costs, such as interest payments and distributions to shareholders. However, interest payments or distributions to shareholders in the final analysis are a transfer of cash from one agent (firm, etc.) to another (financial institution, etc.) taking place in another market circuit. For the purposes of this analysis, which is limited to the production circuit, it is not particularly relevant who will benefit from the cash surpluses of the firm (the owner, the shareholders or the bank). This is not to say that the distribution of the cash surplus is not a factor which should be ignored, but it is the case that when sectors or regional economies are examined the prime interest is on the differences in cost recovery and not the agents that benefit from them2.

(1)	Cost recovery/Sunk Costs    = 	Value-added minus Labour Costs minus
						Annual Depreciation of Capital

Equation (1) demonstrates that production costs are not taken into account in the measurement of sunk costs. This is not a deficiency of the formula but, instead, arises because value-added is estimated statistically, net of production expenses other than labour costs. In Greece and, for the most part, elsewhere value-added is estimated indirectly from gross production value by deducting consumption expenses (raw materials, fuels, maintenance costs etc.). Thus, if from value-added are subtracted the two categories of costs relating to labour remuneration and depreciation of capital, then a measure of cost recovery involving cash surpluses or sunk costs is produced.

Capital depreciation plays a key role in the estimation of sunk costs. Capital investment and depreciation are two closely related, highly inter-dependent notions. Firms do not commit all their capital expenditure at once but constantly increase the stock of their fixed assets through rounds of new investment. Depreciation represents the decline in the rental prices of the capital services. Therefore, in order to construct a measure of fixed capital stock for a sector/region, apart from the new additions, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the patterns of depreciation of the past investments. In addition, in order to produce an estimate of the amount of fixed capital that is depreciated annually a measure of the capital stock is needed. Under the assumption that depreciation represents the decline in the rental price of the capital services, the calculated net measures of the fixed capital stock reflect the market value of the fixed capital that is available to business at the beginning of the year. This will be reduced by the end of the year according to the depreciation. Hence, the use of equation (1) for the measurement of the sunk costs/cost recovery is not only empirically feasible and useful, but is also theoretically sound. The yearly decline in the market value of the fixed capital has to be recouped from the produced value-added so that sunk costs do not arise. Given that labour cannot remain unpaid, or at least not fully paid for long periods, it is logical that negative cost recovery reflects and is, in essence, unretrievable capital costs.

4. Operationalising the concept of sunk cost in the regions of Greece.
The operationalisation of the ideas above obviously is highly dependent on the availability of appropriate data. In Greece, the National Statistical Service (ESYE) undertakes an annual industrial survey covering all manufacturing firms employing more than twenty and a sample of firms employing more than ten. Regionally, data for firms employing more than twenty are also available. The published data include employment, number of establishments, gross production value, consumption, value-added, remuneration of employment and total gross asset formation, while unpublished data on employer national insurance contributions are also available. These data, with the exception of employment and number of establishments, are available only in current prices so have to be deflated prior to use in dynamic analysis. Gross production value, value-added and labour remuneration figures can be transformed straightforwardly into constant 1980 prices by using the GDP deflators, while total gross asset formation figures can be transformed into constant 1980 prices by using the manufacturing fixed asset formation deflators. These deflators derive from dividing annual GDP or manufacturing fixed asset formation data in current prices with the same data in constant prices. Relevant figures are provided in the national income and expenditure section of the Statistical Yearbooks of Greece.

A measurement of fixed capital stock is a prerequisite for the estimation of the amount of the capital depreciated annually. This measurement can be undertaken using total gross asset formation data. However, it has to be stated that this is a complicated process based upon highly arbitrary assumptions. In previous work not only the problems - theoretical and empirical - but also the need for estimations of regional capital stock have been outlined (MELACHROINOS and SPENCE, 1997b). It has been shown that different estimations of regional manufacturing capital stock can be produced under different sets of hypotheses. The most striking finding is that almost all of these assumptions seem to be perfectly sound from an inherent standpoint of plausibility and logic. Furthermore, as far as the evolution (annual growth rates) of regional manufacturing capital stock is concerned, all estimations tend to produce similar trends. Based on the quality of data available to this research a preference for the results of the double-declining balance depreciation pattern, assuming an 18 year full depreciation period has been expressed. The assumptions (shorter service lives and faster depreciation in early years) of this particular methodology, which considerably reduce the influence of potentially overestimated past investment levels, make it a safer bet. The annual depreciation of the regional manufacturing capital stock can be easily measured from the capital stock estimations that have been produced in this way.

Since the necessary data are available, or can be constructed given certain assumptions, the analysis can proceed with the exploration of the regional differences in manufacturing sunk costs/cost recovery. However, prior to this, the raw data are themselves informative and worth brief consideration in terms of regional economic performance. 

TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE

The evolution of regional manufacturing value-added and labour costs is portrayed in tables 1 and 2. A stagnation of Greek manufacturing, in terms of value-added, is apparent between 1984 and 1993. Although there are some minor annual fluctuations in the intermediate years, the value-added in 1993 is slightly higher (less than 4%) than in 1984. The phenomenal stagnation nationally, however, does not mean an absence of change regionally. Rises in manufacturing value-added are recorded in about half of all regions. The most severe decline is in Western Makedonia and the Southern Aegean Islands where value-added drops by more than 60% in ten years. These regions are followed by the Northern Aegean and Ionian Islands, where losses are above 40%. In contrast, value-added increases by more than a third in Kriti and Ipiros. These trends indicate the existence of a dual process of manufacturing growth and decline taking place simultaneously in Greek regions during this period. Given that the regional economic bases cannot be generally characterised as competitive one with another, gains in some regions should not be attributed to losses in others.





The evolution of the annual depreciation of regional manufacturing capital stock is presented in table 3. This indicator, as with labour remuneration, tends to decrease both nationally and regionally between 1984-1993. Only Attiki, Ionian Islands, and marginally Kriti experience increases in the depreciation of capital. These trends are hardly a surprise given that during the period manufacturing capital stock was much reduced in all Greek regions, with the three exceptions already mentioned (MELACHROINOS and SPENCE, 1997b). Clearly this is due to the decline in total gross asset formation levels after 1983. Although it would appear, at first sight, that this decline is a positive development in terms of cost recovery, given that the committed capital costs that have to be retrieved are becoming smaller, it does have other significant implications. Basically, it reflects a decline in the manufacturing capital stock and the reluctance of firms to invest in the industrial base of the majority of Greek regions. Put differently, what is revealed is a dramatic and severe process of dis-investment occurring almost everywhere. Most certainly, the decline in manufacturing capital stock is in accordance with the often speculated process of industrial downsizing.

These trends are complemented also by a decrease in the number of manufacturing establishments employing more than twenty (the number drops by 848 over ten years). An interesting question that should be asked is whether the decline in the indicators developed here derives from firm closure or reflects general trends affecting all firms. Data availability does not permit the answering of these questions at this stage. Therefore, downsizing should be approached strictly as a process taking place at the level of the regional manufacturing base rather than that of the individual firm.

5. Sunk costs, cash surpluses and economic performance in Greek regions




The first observation about table 4, which presents absolute values of cost recovery, is that cash surpluses generated nationally by large scale manufacturing (establishments with more than 20 employees) are not only positive but follow a rather positive trend over the period. Only during the last year (1993) does the amount of the cash surplus drop. It has to be recalled that during the same period the trends in employment, labour remuneration and capital stock have been negative, while only marginal increases in the value-added were recorded. Undoubtedly, this out turn should be attributed to the reduction in the costs (capital investment and labour costs) that the firms committed during this time. Behaving in this way has enabled manufacturing firms to recover their costs more easily and to create higher cash surpluses, although it is the case that in most regions severe job and capital stock losses in large scale manufacturing were experienced. Consequently, the manufacturing decline in general that was recorded in almost all Greek regions was not accompanied by a decline, or even stagnation, in the amount of the cash that was generated by the sector. Surpluses continued to expand without interruption during the whole period, save for the last year. However, what is more important is that it would appear that these large amounts of cash so generated did not act as a stimulus for firms to reinvest in the nation’s manufacturing base.

Straightforward regional comparisons with absolute figures on cost recovery are difficult to make. However, it is apparent that the majority of regions tend to follow (or contribute to) the national trends. Western Makedonia is the only region where negative figures prevail for the whole period. These deficits represent real sunk costs faced by the manufacturing base of the region. Such a finding for this region is hardly a surprise - even with the conventional view of sunk costs it was expected that the manufacturing base would face unretrievable costs. The two main industrial centres of the area - Kozani and Kastoria - have faced severe de-industrialisation problems since the early nineties. In Kozani, there was a large concentration of indebted firms some of which were state-owned, while Kastoria accounted in 1988 - according to the census of Greek industry (ESYE, unpublished data) - for almost the 40% of national employment in the fur/leather garments sector. It is logical to think that these establishments were facing industrially-specific sunk costs. A large number of plants seem to have closed during 1993 (the number of large establishments in the region drops from 47 to 21 between the years 1992 and 1993). (Such statements cannot be fully supported with the available data as the firms might now employ less than 20 employees but continue to operate). However, if the evolution of the value-added is taken into account it is apparent that many non-profit-making plants are located in this region.

Other regions that do not follow the national trends in cost recovery in simple constant prices are those of the Northern Aegean, Southern Aegean and Ionian Islands. In the last region the cash surplus that is generated annually tends to decline over time while in the first two areas persistent real deficits are recorded. These deficits can also be attributed to causes similar to the Western Makedonia case (presence of indebted firms etc.).

The common characteristic of the four regions where either sunk costs emerge, or the cash surpluses of industrial activity are falling, is that value-added declines substantially (by more than 40%). This empirical observation supports the notion argued here that sunk costs should be approached as unrealised value. If value-added (which is dependent upon the price at which the commodities are sold in the market) was higher, these regions would not face such severe sunk costs or reduced cash surpluses. Given that no significant new major investments were undertaken in these regions it is difficult to attribute the local cost recovery problems to massive committed costs. Even labour costs dropped dramatically in these areas during the period. Sunk costs seem to be a phenomenon primarily related to the simple inability of the establishments of certain regions to realise in the market the full value of their product. Although, there is no way, as yet, to tell whether a trade of local fixed assets took place between the local plants and firms of the remaining regions, this seems a rather unlikely event. Not only is it the case that a rather small portion of used fixed assets is traded domestically, but also truly immobile fixed assets (lots and sites, buildings, and other fixed assets) account for something around one half of average total gross asset formation (MELACHROINOS and SPENCE, 1997b).





The figures of table 5 are indicative of the trends that have been already described. Nationally, cost recovery follows a positive trend not only in absolute terms but also as a percentage of value-added. An interesting observation is that cost recovery is improved even in areas where the absolute value-added declined during the period (Thessalia, Western Greece, Central Greece). This development is related to the relatively higher decline of labour costs and capital depreciation components. An interesting question to be asked is whether the downsizing of manufacturing activity in these areas, even in terms of value-added, is associated with an attempt to increase levels of cost recovery. The only regions where cost recovery as percentage of the value-added deteriorates were the Ionian Islands, Western Makedonia and the Southern Aegean Islands.





In the absence of a thread that connects the various regions belonging to each group the analysis should then focus on the evolution of labour costs and annual capital depreciation as percentage of the value-added. This study makes it possible to check at least whether similar trends are under way in the grouped regions. However, the co-examination of these two indicators does not seem to provide unequivocal evidence in this respect. The second group, for instance, is a mix of regions that show either high annual capital depreciation (Western Greece, Ipiros) or high labour remuneration (Attiki, Eastern Makedonia-Thraki). But it is also true that in some regions of the other two groups similar features also seem to occur. Perhaps more important is the fact that the third group is composed of regions that show both high annual capital depreciation (with exception of the Southern Aegean Islands) and high labour costs (with the exception of Central Greece), while the first group is formed of several regions that experience the exactly opposite conditions. These findings certainly do not suggest that the taxonomy of regions according to the cost recovery index should be perceived as a particularly meaningful or helpful in terms of process typology of regional performance. The underlying causes of regional change or inertia are so divergent that in any case it is impossible for a single indicator to depict them. However, this classification reveals that even quite distinct processes that take place within different spatial entities can generate similar results. This study of effects should not diminish efforts to explore the processes that produce them.

Nevertheless, a more careful examination of the annual evolution in the levels of regional cost recovery shows that in this empirical context the effects are persistent. The groups do consist of regions that share only few common characteristics but there is no notable volatility in their comparative regional performance. Phrased differently, in the regions of the third group - those facing sunk costs (Western Makedonia, Northern Aegean Islands, Southern Aegean Islands) or limited cost recovery (Central Greece) - the negative trends prevail for the whole decade. In contrast, in the regions where cost recovery is relatively high (Central Makedonia, Kriti, Peloponissos etc.) the positive trends do indeed prevail for the whole period.

Unquestionably, this last finding stresses the role of sunk costs as a change-inhibiting factor. Cost recovery/sunk costs appear to be a factor that has long term implications in regional economic performance. Moreover, it is evident that the alternative view of sunk costs presented here has indeed led to the construction of an indicator that gives meaningful results in this sense.

6. Conclusions
The primary aim of this paper was to explore the spatial implications of sunk costs by measuring their impact in regional economic performance. This goal was served by the development of an alternative view of the concept that makes possible the measurement of these costs in a regional context. Sunk costs are primarily related to the inability of the firms to realise the full value of their capital investment either in the form of produced commodities/services or in the form of the residual value of the capital investment itself. In this light, the utilisation of the cost recovery notion has proved useful in the construction of a sunk costs/cost recovery indicator. The results of the empirical research into the performance of Greek regions during the eighties and the early nineties not only supports this notion of sunkness but also provides some new insight into the process of regional development.

The regions that face higher sunk costs levels or experience low cost recovery rates are those in which the value-added declines severely over time. Moreover, relatively low or relatively high rates of regional cost recovery are persistent for the whole period indicating the nature of sunk costs as a change-inhibiting factor.

However, apart from this plausible empirical support for the alternative view what is perhaps more interesting is to speculate on the spatial implications of sunk costs. The exploration of the evolution of the cost recovery here throws some light on aspects of regional economic performance that tend to be neglected when other indicators are solely used. The apparent downsizing of large scale manufacturing activity that took place in the majority of regions in the form of employment and capital stock decline is accompanied not only by a rise in the cost recovery levels as percentage of the value-added but also by an increase in the generated cash surpluses. Many crucial questions arise in relation to this. Is the decline of regional manufacturing bases the outcome of low cost recovery rates and, if so, why did the increase in cost recovery rates during the whole period considered here not lead to an increase in capital investment levels or manufacturing expansion? What made the incumbent firms in almost every region reluctant to commit even increased labour costs, let alone implement new investments, despite the positive outcomes in terms of their investment returns?

In order to answer these questions properly further examination is required of many other questions, for example what can be thought of as adequate levels of cost recovery, or who are the agents (shareholders, financial institutions etc.) that have benefited most from the surpluses and what have they done with them? The same is the case for many other issues that are raised by the above analysis. The persistence of sunk costs and low cost recovery in some regions and the prevalence of high levels of cost recovery in others is definitely an aspect that should be given more attention in future research. Moreover, the prevalence of high or low levels of cost recovery in regions that do not share common characteristics, or even in some cases that do not experience the same trends, is intriguing. Here might be a manifestation of the simple geographical truth that divergent processes might have similar results in different places. (It is equally intriguing to ponder that similar processes might generate different results in different places.) However, what has been discovered here might just be an indication that adequate levels of regional cost recovery are dependent not only upon national/international trends, or the evolution of industrial competition, but also upon local factors ('history', ‘tradition’, entrepreneurship, etc.).

Undoubtedly, the common thread that connects all these questions is the relation between sunk costs and regional economic performance. What it is hoped is clear from this analysis is that sunk costs are both a cause and an outcome of bad economic performance. This paper has been about the conceptual underpinnings and practical measurement of sunk costs in a real world context. Once operationalised, they appear potentially to be a feature that can highlight many of the neglected aspects of regional economic performance.
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Figure 1. Labour cost, capital depreciation, and cost recovery/sunk costs as percentage of value added in the regions of Greece. Overall averages for the years 1984-1993.
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